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PREFACE
As the demand on domestic energy supplies increases,
States will experience substantial pressure to permit addi-
tional energy development. While this is often perceived
as an economic plus for a locality, it can create con-
flicts. The growth of the energy industry promises more
jobs and additional tax revenue, but it can also put
local fiscal arrangements into turmoil and fracture
the social character of a community. Overcrowded schools,
inadequate housing supplies and a decrease in the quality
of municipal services often occur in areas experiencing
rapid population growth as a result of energy development.
Since many of the impacts of energy development
extend beyond the boundaries of a single locality, State
Governments have an important role to play in addressing
these issues. The purpose of this Thesis is to examine
one option for siting these energy facilities, so as to
minimize the negative effects as much as possible. The
"Auction Method" for energy facility siting, consists of
a system whereby communities would submit a bid in order
to have an energy facility develop within their own juris-
diction. The bid would be an offer by the local govern-
ment, such that if it is accepted, the political unit
will agree to facilitate the development of the energy
industry. Money received would then be distributed to
the community and to individuals on a per capita basis.
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Chapter I introduces the "Auction Method" by providing
a two-fold justification for its implementation: That
Socio-Economic Impacts should be accounted for in de-
cisions relating to energy facility siting; and that
Compensation should be given to those residents of the
community likely to bear the effects of energy development.
Chapter II provides a model for legislation, which State
Governments can adapt to their own specific needs and
statutes. A discussion of the legal issues of imple-
mentation follows, focusing on the contractual agreement
that would bind this system to the parties involved.
Chapter III applies this method to the State of Colorado,
with an adaptation of the legislative model so as to
avoid conflicts with Colorado State Laws.
Professor Michael O'Hare, originator of the "Auction
Method," was very helpful in guiding the development of
many of the ideas in this thesis. Professor Lawrence
Susskind helped to edit this report, and provided useful
insight into the policy questions which are addressed.
Professor Frank Michelman of the Harvard Law School is
also to be acknowledged for consultation on the legislative
issues addressed in the thesis.
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I INTRODUCTION TO THE AUCTION CONCEPT
A. The Need to Account for Socio-Economic Impacts in
Facility Siting
The framework within which the siting and construction
of facilities now occurs consists of a complex collection
of federal, state and local laws, which regulate the devel-
oper choosing a suitable location. The laws and programs
have been designed separately, over time, to achieve a
variety of social objectives, most of which relate to the
protection of environmental resources. In the past decade
alone, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (1972)
2
the Clean Air Act (1970) , and the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA, 1969)3 have provided a comprehensive
program of protecting natural resources whenever a new
facility is constructed. In particular, NEPA requires
federal agencies to rigorously assess the impacts of any
"major action" that is likely to produce significant
effects. Legislation and executive orders in a growing
number of states also mandate assessment procedures, simi-
lar to those under NEPA, for government decision-makers. 4
While environmental ramifications of proposed projects
are accounted for under existing statutes, socio-economic
impacts are not considered as prime factors in an evalua-
tion of a potential site. For the purpose of this thesis,
socio-economic (sometimes referred to as second-order)
impacts are defined as the local environmental, social and
economic effects indirectly caused by facility siting
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activity. Examples will be derived from energy facility
siting, but this should not be construed to mean that the
auction model is applicable only in this situation. Many
types of industry under construction in a given area are
likely to cause impacts associated with population growth.
Slight variances in the types of problems will be notice-
able, depending on the nature of the industry and the type
of governmental and infrastructure framework where the
development occurs.
On April 20, 1977, in a message to'Congress, President
Carter outlined a national energy policy for the next few
years. His underlying strategy is to reduce U.S. depend-
ence on imported oil, and instead shift to conservation
and a greater reliance on domestic sources, such as coal,
supplemented by nuclear and solar energy. 5 This implies
a proliferation of energy facilities within this country
during the next decade. Critical choices are going to have
to be made as to where to locate the new developments,
and it is the underlying assumption of this thesis that
socio-economic impacts should be considered during the
decision-making process. Options undoubtedly will be limit-
ed to areas where the natural resources are readily avail-
able (i.e. mining can only be done where the coal is, and
nuclear reactors are preferably located near a source of
water). However, a certain degree of choice does exist.
The U.S. Government depicts areas currently considered
potential sites for coal and nuclear power plants respec-
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tively. Even with regard to coal, a number of potential
locations exist to mine the low-sulfur type. Once a number
of sites are selected as feasible, in light of the availa-
bility of natural resources, then the secondary assessment
can be utilized in making the final selection.
Hundreds of new energy projects, including coal mines,
nuclear power plants, and offshore oil and gas are proposed
to meet our national energy needs. Benefits from the
location of such facilities in towns are numerous, includ-
ing: a long term increase in revenue for the local econony;
increased employment opportunities; diversification of the
economic base by an increase in businesses and subsidiary
industries; and finally, a net gain in the supply of
domestic energy. Regional and National economies stand to
gain from such development.
While energy expansion-is often perceived as an eco-
nomic plus, it can create conflicts. The basic problems
are caused by sudden population surges in formerly rural
towns which do not have the capacity to rapidly expand
their infrastructures in order to accommodate increased
demands on goods and services. Some localities double and
triple in size during a short period of time due to the
immigration of construction and operating forces, who often
6
bring their families. Table I provides an estimate of
direct employment increases which result from a variety
of typical energy projects. Tables II and III document
the net increase in total population which would result
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from one of the examples in the previous table, both
temporary and permanent.
The net increase in population poses significant
problems, since the demand for goods and services far
outstrips a community's capacity to respond. One of the
most serious problems confronting localities is in the
area of housing. Usually there are few vacancies, and
many of the newcomers have no other option but to live in
mobile homes located in scattered clusters throughout the
community on undeveloped tracts of land. New homes are
also difficult to obtain, since the building industry is
reluctant to develop due to the uncertainty about the
permanence of the boom. Even if vacancies existed, local
banks rarely have the resources needed to meet mortgage
demands. This is particularly true in areas of large
population growth, where the heavy and sudden demand, along
with a small and limited supply, undoubtedly results in
inflated prices for both buying and renting. 8 These
increased costs impose burdens on all, but especially hard
hit are the elderly people, many of whom are on fixed in-
comes. For those local residents from the pre-boom period,
it also becomes increasingly difficult to purchase a higher
quality of home, and remain in the community. The inflated
costs on the market can make the difference between buying
a new home and remaining in the old, even if we assume that
they will get a greater return on their current residence.
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TABLE I.
Employment Requirements of Typical Energy Projects
B. C.
Coal Export Mine
Electric Generating Plant
Substitute Gasification Plant
Oil Shale Processing Facility
Nuclear Power Plant
Offshore Oil and Gas
Platform Fabrication Facility
Deepwater Port
LNG Conversion Plant
Oil Refinery
Key
A.
B.
C.
D.
9m t/y
2250 Mw
250 mcf/day
50,000 bbl/day
1600 Mw
Per Rig
2 platforms/yr.
2 mooring spaces
1000 mcf/day
250,000 bbl/day
Type of Project
Size of Project
Peak Force Construction
Operating Force
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Community Planning, 1976.
Note: Statistics are for illustration only, to give
a general idea of impacts, which may vary,
depending on the situation.
A. D.
200
3000
3500
2400
2500
175
400
1250
400
4500
475
400
1250
1450
150
90
1500
90
1500
90
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Table II
ExamDle of a 2250 MW Coal-Fired Electric Generating Plant
Employment and Population Added by CONSTRUCTION
x 3.7 per family __s 4440
800
1776
480
..'Ratio of support --- ]
workers to construc- 40S
tion.
20% Local Residents
Total Population Added 7496
This figure assumes that all construction workers come from
outside the community. About 60% may bring their families, with an
average family size of 3.7 persons.
For each construction worker, 0.6 secondary workers will be
required. 40% of these secondary workers will have families, 40%
will not, and 20% will be local residents not adding to the popu-
lation. In this example, 2000 project workers will result in an
added population of 7500, during the CONSTRUCTION period, which is
a temporary increase.
SOURCE: Peak employment figures, and their breakdown in terms
of married and single, come from statistics developed by the Office
of Planning and Management Assistance, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 1976. Figure of 3.7 people per family
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, 1970.
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Table III
Example of a 2250 MW Coal-Fired Electric Generating Plant
Employment and Population Added by Operations
2438
116
1720
465
Total Population Added 4739
This figure assumes the number of permanent residents that
will be added to a community. The percentage of workers with
families residing in the community will increase to between 80
and 90% of the total. The number of secondary workers will also
increase, to a range of 1.1 to 2.3 for each employee of the energy
project. For the same 2250 MW project, 775 permanent workers will
result in an added permanent population of 4739 for this particular
example.
SOURCE: Employment figures and their breakdown in terms of
married and single, come from statistics developed by the
Office of Planning and Management Assistance, 1976. Figure of
3.7 people per family comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, 1970.
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A second major area of socio-economic concern is the
problem over the provision of community services to the
residents. For example, sewage treatment facilities and
water systems may not have the capacity to expand enough in
order to accommodate the increased population. These are
very capital intensive projects which must be given high
priority during the initial stages of the boom. Schools
likewise tend to become overcrowded, with split sessions
instituted within the educational system. Medical facili-
ties, often times already scarce in rural areas, become
more overtaxed. Doctors, whose number of clients may
double, are forced to cut corners and often times decrease
the frequency and quality of their services. Public safety
is also jeopardized, since more people in a town inherently
impose a greater burden on police and fire protection. Of
particular concern to these two departments is the problem
of safeguarding mobile homes that are sporadically scatter-
ed throughout the area.
Finally, a decrease in the over-all quality of life
occurs in towns impacted by industrial development. This
change, however, is most noticeable to the pre-boom
inhabitants whose lifestyles may undergo a transition
through no choice of their own. First, the town is likely
to lose its rural character and succumb to the problems
associated with congestion and overcrowding. Traffic tie-
ups are likely to occur on rural thoroughfares, particular-
ly on those roads leading to the actual facility site.
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General prices on goods usually increase, which hits hard
at those residents whose salary may not be commensurate to
that obtained by the new construction workers. Crime and
violence usually increase, and problems of alcoholism and
social stress are often prevalent. Recreational facili-
ties cannot accommodate the increased demand, and few of
the new jobs are suitable for wives of the construction
workers, leading to feelings of isolation on their part.
In all, the homogeneity of the town undergoes a change,
and the small, friendly atmosphere takes on a more imper-
sonal environment. The following example illustrates the
overall magnitude of the problems experienced by energy
facility impacted communities.
The town of Craig in Moffat County has experienced
rapid increases in population since 1970 and expects even
more growth in the future as a result of energy development.
In 1970 Craig's population was 4,205. By 1976 this figure
had risen to approximately 7000.10 Further projections
indicate that by 1983 there may be over 10,000 residents
in this Colorado town (see Table IV).
So far, most of the growth has been spurred by the
Yampa Project. Two turbine generated units, each with a
net capacity of approximately 380 megawatts, will be com-
pleted by 1978. The Colorado-Ute Electrical Association
which operates this facility hopes to build two more
units by 1986.11 The Utah International Coal Mine which,
by 1979 will provide surface coal for the Yampa Project
14.
TABLE IV
Population Projections, Craig, Colorado
Population
11,195
9,803
9,998
10,199
10,406
10,613
Source: Front End Funding Advisory Committee of Craig,
1976.
Note: The figures are based on employment projections
compiled by the following companies that are
expected to cause population increases in Craig:
Colorado-Ute Electrical Association
Utah International
W.R. Grace Company -
Empire Energy
Denver Rio Grande Railroad
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
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at a rate of 2 million tons per year, has also caused part
of the Craig boom.1 2 Additional pressure, but to a lesser
extent can be traced to the W.R. Grace Mines, the Empire
Energy Company, and the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad.
As Table IV indicates, Craig has an unstable popula-
tion. Temporary workers hired by the coal companies during
construction have not remained in the area. Thus, town
officials face the problem of how to provide for housing
and municipal services on a temporary basis. Planning for
basic needs under these conditions is extraordinarily dif-
ficult.
In 1976, the residents of Craig faced a variety of
problems: overcrowded educational facilities, housing
shortages, inadequate medical care and social disruption.
According to Mayor Doyle Jackson, the basic problem was
and is financial.1 3
Enrollment in the Moffat County School System has
increased substantially over the past few years. In Febru-
ary 1976, over 2000 children were enrolled in the Craig
portion of the school district, an increase of 18% over
the February 1974 figures.1 4 Temporary classrooms have
been set up to accommodate an additional 300 pupils.15
Department of Interior projections indicate that enrol-
lment will probably reach 3,000 by 1978.16 This District
is already on split sessions.
The housing shortage in Craig is likely to become
even worse. Both rental and sales units are almost filled
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to capacity. A group of experts and citizens known as the
Moffat County-Craig Front End Finance Committee was formed
to grapple with these problems. The Committee reports
that while 1,392 units are either currently in the plan-
ning stages or under construction, this will not begin to
satisfy the pent up demand. Over 1,800 units will be
required by 1978, 400 more than are presently under way or
contemplated. While Carbondale's Comprehensive Plan calls
for an emphasis on multi-family dwellings, two-thirds of
Craig's 1400 planned units will probably be mobile homes.17
People who are seeking site homes are likely to be dis-
satisfied.
The increasing number of Craig residents is also
straining the available medical facilities. Rural areas
traditionally lack the number of doctors needed to care
for people. Even in the pre-boom days this was true in
Craig. With the demand for private medical care far out-
stripping the availability of family practitioners,
citizens are turning to hospital out-patient clinics for
help. Outpatient visits at the Memorial Hospital almost
doubled between 1971 and 1975 (increasing by over 3,000
visits). Between 1976 and 1980 outpatient visits are pro-
jected to increase by another 85%.18
According to Mayor Doyle Jackson, Craig has been a
victim of the so-called "Boomtown Syndrome." Basically,
this phrase implies that there has been a general decrease
in the quality of life for most of the natural residents
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of this town. Educational services and recreational faci-
lities have not been responsive to the demands of huge num-
bers of people. Crime, alcoholism, suicides and suicide
attempts have all increased. Social problems usually
associated with big-city life, such as congestion, in-
flationary prices, and fear have surfaced. As Mayor Jack-
son concludes, this contributes to feelings of alienation
among both new and in particular old time residents, as
well as a decrease in community spirit. 1 9
Signs of mental and social stress produced by rapid
growth are becoming more evident. As of August, 1975, the
Craig unit of the Colorado West Regional Mental Health Cen-
ter experienced a six month 50% increase in cases. 40%
of these involved people employed by nearby energy indus-
tries. Construction workers living in trailer parks wait-
ing for site homes to become.available are experiencing
severe family stress. Between August 1975 and February
1976 the caseload in Craig almost doubled. 53% of all
active cases appear to be linked to energy development.
In the early 1970's, only 17% of all active cases were
energy industry associated. 20
As the population has grown, revenues have not kept
pace with the need for increased local expenditures to
finance capital improvement projects. The result is that
the overall quality of services has declined. In 1970,
Craig was operating at a $94.65 per capita level as com-
pared to an $83.39 level in 1976 (calculated in 1970 dol-
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lars).2 1 Over the past six years local retail prices have
increased 50% more than the national average.2 2
One of the main problems for Craig is that Utah Inter-
national, the Colorado-Ute power plants and the other local
coal mines do not generate additional tax revenues because
they are located outside of the town limits. They pay no
property tax to Craig, yet most of the workers in the area
reside in the town and demand adequate public services.2 3
While all towns do not experience the same impacts, Craig
is a fairly typical example of a locality seriously af-
fected by the siting of energy facilities.
It is obvious that facility siting causes impacts
that go beyond those of an environmental nature, which
current laws focus most of their attention on. The Feder-
al Government recognizes the existence of secondary ef-
fects, and the Council on Environmental Quality recommends
that these factors be included in the environmental im-
pact statement. Section 1500.8 of the Impact Assessment
Guidelines of the CEQ proposes that:
Secondary or indirect, as well as primary or
direct, consequences for the environment should
be included in the analysis. For example, the
effects of the proposed action on population
and growth may be among the more significant
secondary effects. Such population and growth
impacts should be estimated if expected to
be significant and an assessment made of the
effect of any possible change in population
patterns or growth upon a resource base, in-
cluding land use, water, and public services,
of the area in question.2
19.
The difficulty is that these are guidelines and not
a mandatory requirement that socio-economic factors be
considered during the evaluation stage of a project. If
a proposal is somewhat environmentally sound, but will
cause secondary impacts, Section 1500.8 does little to
stop it from going through. When alternatives are dis-
cussed in the EIS, they are always done so in environmen-
tal terms, with little emphasis on the socio-economic re-
percussions. A superior policy-system would involve a
comprehensive decision-making process that attempted to
assess both environmental and non-environmental factors.
The status quo does not meet this objective, but an auc-
tion method of facility siting would certainly come closer
to being all inclusive.
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B. The Need to Compensate Individuals and/or Communi-
ties For Negative Impacts
The nation, or at least a large part of a region
usually benefits from the development of facilities. In
the case of an energy project, the country benefits from
the added supply of fuel, and the state benefits from
increased tax revenues. Localities even benefit from
the increased availability of jobs and the added money
from assessments. However, it is this latter group in
particular that bears the brunt of negative impacts, both
environmental,and those of a socio-economic nature (as
described in I-A). The current system is inequitable for
-those who are confronted by these burdens, since society
at large gains with little added expense. A policy of
:compensating these individuals for some of this loss
would be a positive step towards the alleviation of the
inequities inherent in our current system, where the costs
25
-and benefits are not comparable for all par ties involved.
-Under our current system of jurisprudence, compen-
zsation is legally sanctioned in a few specific areas.
Under the laws of eminent domain and torts, for example,
-those whose rights are unjustly infringed upon are awarded
an indemnification for damages occured. It is important
-to note at the outset, that under both of these legal
doctrines, it is the individual who is compensated in most
of the cases. In order to satisfy the court's provision
21.
on standing, a plaintiff must document direct damage
inflicted on his/her person or property to be able to col -
lect remuneration.
The concept of eminent domain gives the government
authority to seize the private property of an individual,
within the realm of the law. The landmark Supreme Court
case of Berman v. Parker 26reiterates the traditional de-
finition of this power, claiming that it is legitimate
only to the extent that the land is taken for the purpose
of a "public use," or "public purpose." Originally emi-
nent domain was used only in the taking of property for
schools, parks, recreational facilities, etc. However,
"public use" has recently been expanded to such projects
as railroads, public power plants, and the operation of
mines. 27 "Public purpose" has been applied to slum clear-
ance projects, where the concern was for the protection
of the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants.
Under these definitions, it is conceivable that the Court
would uphold a seizure of private property for the purpose
of energy facility siting, since the fuel would most like-
ly be used either by or for the benefit of the public.
Once the taking has been allowed by the court, the
government is required to give "just compensation" to
the owner, based on the "fair market value." 28 The amount
of remuneration can be determined by the fact finding
body (jury, judge or administrative tribunal) based on
22.
any one of the following formulas: 1) Sales of similar
properties 2 9 2) Capitalization of income, 30 3) Replace-
31
ment cost less depreciation, - or 4) A combination of
32
the methods. Thus, if any individual loses property
directly due to the condemnation of land for use as an
energy facility site, he will be justly compensated for
the loss under the protective guarantees afforded by our
judicial system. However, the loss is valued only in
terms of physical property. Compensation for intangible
losses, such as time lost by having to search for a suit-
able substitute, inconvenience, or even instability
caused by having to relocate and adjust to a new area,
are not taken into consideration. Thus, if a new compen-
sation system were devised for those negatively affected
by facility siting, they too should be included in the be-
nefits.
The exception to this rule would be those people
who have their property bought directly by the develop-
ers rather than having it condemned and taken through
the courts. Those individuals who privately contract
with industry for the sale of their property have some
degree of choice in the matter, and also maintain the
bargaining leverage to receive adequate remuneration.
They have the option to refuse to sell unless all of
their costs are adequately accounted for. On the con-
trary, those individuals who have their property "seiz-
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ed" do not have as much negotiating flexibility when deal-
ing with a judge or jury. Also, their compensation is li-
mited to the definition of the court in terms of fair mar-
ket value, which does not account for secondary costs.
One final note on the law of eminent domain and just
compensation: If it ever could be extrapolated to include
compensation for secondary impacts, then- a redefinition
of the word "taking" would have to be construed by the
courts. Currently it refers to the direct seizure of
actual land and/or property. "Taking" would have to be
redefined in terms of not only a direct seizure of proper-
ty, but also the loss of rights due to "environmental",
or "quality of life" degradation, in order for socio-
economic impacts to fall under the eminent domain stat-
utes.
A second area of legal doctrine which provides for
compensation is found in the collection of laws that
comes under the heading of Torts. Broadly speaking, a
tort is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract,
for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of
an action for damages. 33 It is directed toward the com-
pensation of individuals, rather than the public, for
losses which they have suffered in respect of all their
legally recognized interestsr where the law requires
compensation. It is concerned with the allocation of
losses arising out of human activity, which theoretical-
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ly covers a wide scope.
Arising out of the various and ever increas-
ing clashes of the activities of persons living
in a common society, carrying on business in
competition with fellow members of that society,
owning property which may in any of a thousand
ways affect the persons or property of others--
in short, doing all the things that constitute
modern living--there must of necessity be losses,
or injuries of many kinds sustained as a result
of the activities of others. The purpose of
this law of torts is to adjust these losses,
and to afford compensation for injuries sustained
by one person as the result of the conduct of
another. 3
At first glance it would seem reasonable to conclude
that the underlying assumption of tort law (i.e. the
protection of individuals against interference or harm
from the activities of others), would support a challenge
for compensation due to socio-economic impacts. After
all, the activity of the energy companies is certainly
infringing on the right to a certain quality of life valued
by residents who are about to be inundated by a surge in
the population of their community. However, this body
of law is bound by a constitutional limitation defined in
a test of reasonableness. Quite simply, in deciding such
cases, the court attempts to strike a reasonable balance
between the plaintiff's claim to protection against
damage and the defendant's claim to freedom of action for
his own ends. 35 The tort-feasor is usually held liable
if he has acted with an unreasonable intention, or because
he has departed from a reasonable standard of care, or if
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the plaintiff is denied the reasonable use of one's own
land. The common thread woven into all torts is the idea
of unreasonable interference with the interest of others.
However, the Court goes one step further and in judg-
ing a tort will look at the legal justification for a de-
fendant's action. The court will hold a defendant re-
sponsible for what the law regards as unjustified, or in
other words, a breach of duty fixed and imposed by the law
3 6itself. Included under the title of Torts is a group of
civil wrongs, ranging from direct interference with the
individual (such as assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment), or with property (such as in trespass and conversion)
up through various forms of negligence (such as products
liability). Thus, the common characteristics are: that
damages be compensible, the action unreasonable, and the
harm be in violation of the law itself. While damage from
socio-economic impacts would probably meet the first two
tests of the court, there is no law which mandates that
they be considered in siting. However, if compensation
restrictions were imposed on the developer, or if he were
required (rather than only encouraged by CEQ Guidelines)
to assess second-order impacts, than residents of boom-
towns could seek legal redress through the courts. The
legal foundation already exists in Tort law for individuals
to be compensated, but does need further development to be
applicable to problems of population growth.
While there really exists no comprehensive means for
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individuals to be co'mpensated, some forms of remuneration
are available to the community as a whole. For example,
industries are sometimes willing to contribute a small
amount of money to help a locality overcome socio-econo-
mic impacts. In the case of Carbondale, Colorado (affected
by the development of coal and an electric generating power
plant), the Mid-Continent Coke and Coal Company has pro-
vided a $10,000 grant to be used for planning purposes.
It has also partially financed a construction project for
homes, and provides private buses to transport workers to
and from the mines.37 Unfortunately, there is no guaran-
tee that such compensation would be forthcoming, and a
wide degree of variance exists among the companies in terms
of willingness to help.
With regards to governmental support, no program has
been devised to alleviate the problems from secondary
impacts in a comprehensive manner (comparable to the
E.P.A. for example, and its responsibility for environ-
mental effects). A variety of Federal agencies do, how-
ever, have funds available for capital projects to be given
to communities, but no guarantee is provided to the affect-
ed area that insures receipt of such assistance. 38
In all, what money does go to second-order impacts,
goes to compensate the communities, rather than the indivi-
dual people who are affected in varying degrees of sever-
ity through no choice of their own. This type of policy
leads to serious inequities among those who must confront
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the secondary ramifications.
A recent challenge to this practice is offered by
Michael O'Hare, who advocates a change in policy from
compensation of the community to compensation of the in-
dividual. In a series of unpublished papers, he cites as
justification for this innovative approach:39
(1) A system of compensation to the individual
would make a project more acceptable to the people. Costly
delays or even complete halts to valuable development al-
legedly could be mitigated by "paying off" the residents
before the in-migration occurs. While it is probably true
that a system of remuneration would go a long way in
quelling organized opposition from within to the project,
it isn't clear why this argument is unique to a program of
individual compensation. In other words, if the residents
were assured that the negative impacts would be taken care
of at the community level, it would logically follow that
their motivation for opposition would diminish as well.
However, in order to receive compensation, the residents
would have to remain in the community.
More persuasively, O'Hare considers the freedom of
choice that various "actors" have in response to energy
related impacts. For example, citizens of the community
do not choose under current procedures whether to have a
facility site in their locality. Instead, once a developer
decides upon a location, and the in-migrant construction
crews arrive, little can be done to stop the socio-economic
28.
impacts that generate from the sudden population growth.
Thus, the pre-boom residents' choice is limited to staying
and bearing an unfair share of costs created by circum-
stances beyond their control, or leaving the community in
which they may have lived all of their lives. In any event,
circumstances for them are worse than their status quo
situation. 4 0
On the other hand, in-migrants come to boomtowns by
their own choice; and implicit in this decision is a con-
clusion on their part that they are no worse off. Con-
struction workers are usually attracted to such areas for
high wages, and are evidently willing to put up with socio-
economic difficulties if they choose to locate in a parti-
cular region. They know ahead of time what the town will
be like, and inherent in their decision to relocate is an
acceptance of these consequences. The pre-boom residents
probably could not foresee the problems from population in-
creases, particularly if generations of their family have
resided in the area. Thus, they are affected differently
in the sense that the quality of life decreases by no
choice of their own. Compensation for the resulting prob-
lems would put pre-boom residents and the in-migrants at a
more equalized level when they eventually confront the com-
munity-wide problems associated with overtaxed services and
infrastructure capacity in need of expansion.
A major problem with compensating individuals, is that
the community as a whole assumes a greater risk in losing
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industrial assistance for planning or capital intensive
costs. Under the current system, industries are encouraged
to help pay for some of the energy related impacts caused
by their development in the locality. However, if they
were to pay individuals in the hope of quelling any delay,
chances are they would no longer feel obligated to assume
any further responsibility. Particularly in the auction
method of compensation (see I-C) where a contractual agree-
ment is made, industries would lose all motivation for
financial assistance to a locality, since they realize
that once the paper is signed, no further obligations (not
included in the contract) can be incurred. The resulting
problem is that community wide difficulties are not funded,
as adequately as they might have been before. Under the
status quo, industries can be negotiated with and pres-
sured to assume a monetary responsibility.
If community wide problems are not adequately funded
than the pre-boom residents will be more severely affected
by a greater decrease in their over-all quality of life.
One of O'Hare's responses to this problem is that the com-
munity could tax all residents (both old and new) to pay
for community problems.4 'Therefore, an initial compensatory
payment to the pre-boom citizens would help to equalize
the costs associated with such a governmental action. The
problem with this, is that taxation is a slow method of
gaining revenue that is needed immediately to expand the
municipal facilities and services. Energy impacted areas
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are characterized by sudden population growth, which de-
mands a quick response in order to meet the increased
needs. Thus, a disadvantage to full compensation for
individuals is that the community would lose its leverage
when attempting to pressure industries into assisting
with the front-end costs associated with rapid growth
development. O'Hare suggests using bonds as a quick
source of funds for front-end costs. However, most refer-
enda in energy impacted communities are being turned down.
The natural residents feel that they should not have to
bear the additional expense caused by industry. Also,
many of the initial in-migrants are there temporarily
for the construction phase only, and thus are not willing
to make a long-term commitment to the locality.
This disadvantage alone does not justify a total re-
jection of the individual compensation concept. Rather,
it calls for some type of compromise, possibly in the form
of compensation being allocated on a percentage basis to
both pre-boom residents and the community at large. For
example, percentage A of sum X (X equals the total amount
of compensation given by the industry) could be granted to
individuals, with the remaining X - A = B, with B being
the amount allocated to the local government for front-
end costs. This would help ease the problem while taxes
are collected, and at the same time provide for a more
equitable system - especially for those who did not choose
to live in a boomtown situation. This would help to alle-
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viate any animosity between the newcomers and oldtimers
that may have resulted from helping out one faction and
not the other, when they were all being confronted with
the same problems.
Compensating the community, even to a small degree,
would also decrease the chances of opposition from in-
migrants, who could potentially delay the construction
of a new project. Industry would probably find this com-
promise more acceptable, since the compensation in part
would be directed at helping their own workers in the com-
munity. Thus, compensating both the individuals and com-
munity projects would make this more politically palatable
as well.
It can be concluded that any type of compensation
system would probably be better than no compensation
at all. One such system that meets these objectives is
to auction facilities to a market of communities.
32.
C. The Auction Method as a Means of Assessing and
Compensating for Socio-Economic Impacts
In response to the two problems confronting boom-
towns (as described in IA and IB), O'Hare proposes that
an "auction" method be utilized for energy facility siting.
The following description is based on his original model,
with procedural modifications. 4 2 The purpose of this
section is to familiarize the reader with the auction
concept, leaving implementation and legal issues to
Chapter II.
According to the auction theory, whenever a project
is proposed, political units would bid to have it located
within their region, assuming that they have resources
adequate to meet the needs of the undertaking. For example,
it would have to be a location where it was feasible to
support the industry proposed, in terms of available
natural resources, transportation, water, etc. A tract
of land in Cambridge for instance, would not be suitable
for an underground coal mine. A political unit eligible
to submit a bid would be any governmental structure with
the authority to make contracts on behalf of its citizens.
This could mean a single local government, or a special
district established to bring industry into a region. The
governing body would receive from the developer information
regarding a description of the project, and the likely
consequences it would cause (both environmental and socio-
economic) for a given site. Of prime importance would
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be the number of new workers the project expected to
employ (both during the construction and operating
phases), and what the net population increases would be.
Additional information would come from the state, and
each locality would also generate its own projections.
Environmental assessment, as demanded by the Federal
and State Environmental Impact Statement requirements,
would remain the same.
Once localities had the time to assess the informa-
tion, each one would individually submit a bid for the
project. Presumably (as would be in the best interest of
the community), the bid would reflect an appropriate
level of compensation that could reasonably meet some of
the expenses associated with the anticipated impacts.
Once the state receives all of the bids, it decides on a
given site based on a cost/benefit analysis of the avail-
able alternatives.
The developer and the political unit then legally
bind themselves through a contractual agreement to have
the project completed within the locality and the compensa-
tion paid. The local government maintains the responsi-
bility of facilitating the completion of the development,
making any zoning, regulatory or land use changes included
in the agreement. The developer likewise, is responsible
to reasonably keep within the boundaries of the projected
impacts with regard to both type and severity of effects.
If a development results in impacts which are unreasonably
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more serious then originally projected, the developer is
liable for further compensation. This additional liability
burden would be stipulated in the contractual agreement.
The developer further provides monetary compensation (as
determined by the bid), a certain percentage to the indi-
viduals who resided in the community during the time of
the bid, and the remainder to the governing unit to be
used for front-end financing costs.
By such a method, the problems outlined in the above
two sections are theoretically alleviated:
1) By being forced to pay compensation, the in-
dustry is legally bound to assess the socio-economic
ramifications of a development. These factors would then
become an integral part of the energy facility siting de-
cision-making process; and
2) A more equitable system of sharing costs
and benefits is promulgated, by having the individuals
who are most affected be the ones to receive the vast
majority of compensatory funds. Developers assume a fair
burden of having to accept some responsibility for causing
negative impacts. Even if they pass the costs on to the
consumers, it is more equitable for the users to pay an
additional price, than for the impacted areas to suffer
the consequences.
While this system appears possible, legal and pragma-
tic issues must be resolved. Chapter II attempts to ad-
dress some of these constitutionally based difficulties
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through a draft legislative proposal, and an analysis of
specific implementation alternatives.
The key questions are:
1. How does a locality determine the appro-
priate amount to bid?
2. How should the compensation be paid?
3. What responsibilities would each party
assume in signing the contractual agree-
ment?
4. What are the legal limitations of the
contractual agreement?
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II THE AUCTION MODEL: AN ANALYSIS OF DRAFT LEGISLATION
FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION
A. A Draft Legislative Proposal for the Auction Method
as Applied to Energy Facility Siting
Auctions can be used to site a variety of facilities,
ranging from transmission lines to prison facilities.
While a basic legislative proposal can be developed, sub-
sequent amendments will have to be advanced in order for
the law to be adaptable to other situations. For example,
in the case of transmission lines there is no a priori
identifiable community involved. Rather, the partial
taking of property rights belonging to landowners is the
compensible impact, thus 100% of the indemnification would
be granted to them individually. The following draft
proposal is designed for use in the siting of more non-
linear energy facilities, including coal mines, oil shale
development, power plants and nuclear reactors. It is
planned so as not to conflict with status quo federal
regulations that also govern energy siting, particularly
environmental ones. Thus, it will deviate somewhat from
a standard, universally applicable model, but in doing so
will enhance the workability of the auction concept with
regard to locating energy related development. It can
consequently serve as a model for legislation in other
areas.
In order for the auction method to be feasible for a
certain type of energy project, the following conditions
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must exist:
1) More than one site must be available
By "availability" it is meant that a specific location
is acceptable to industry from the standpoint of available
supporting resources and second, that a local political
unit must be willing to accept the development at some
price, identified through the bidding process, should it
"win." Only when two or more mutually acceptable locations
enter the process, can an auction be'held. The more
communitites that become involved, the more likely is an
optimal solution achievable. Thus, any version of the
auction process should encourage as many bids as possible
for consideration.
2) A Recognized, Representative Political Unit Must
Exist
The actual site location, as well as the seriously
affected areas, must be in jurisdictions headed by a
representative political unit. The auction proposed works
through the governments which represent the affected people.
This is necessary in order to have a valid contractual
agreement between the developer and the community (through
the representatives) on the agreed terms. Some of the
projects for development are likely to cause impacts which
go beyond the boundaries of one jurisdiction. In some
instances, state lines may even be crossed. For example,
the developable oil shale land in the Rocky Mt. region is
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situated on the Colorado-Utah border, where extraction in
one state is likely to affect the other. Under circumstan-
ces such as this, only one bid would be submitted, based
on the decision of the governmental units representing the
affected areas. Inter-jurisdictional cooperation, which
is allowed by most state constitutions, would also have to
be sanctioned by any legislative proposal implementing the
auction method. Governments should also be allowed to form
special districts, if they so choose, to accomplish the
same end. Unincorporated jurisdictions or local citizen
groups would be precluded from bidding in this process.
3) The Imoacts Must be Identifiable and Compensible
One of the prime reasons for having an auction method,
is to insure that a more equitable system of sharing costs
be guaranteed. In order to insure that adequate compensa-
tion will be paid, a locality must be able (i) to identify
all of the potential impacts and (ii) to set a monetary
value on the cost of certain future degeneration in condi-
tions (decrease in school quality, for example). Also,
unless the impacts are reasonably identifiable prior to the
signing of the contract, a breach in the agreement would
likely occur. If the impacts were considerably more severe
than originally stipulated, the locality could hold the
developer liable for further compensation, due to non-
compliance on the part of the industry. Guidelines for
further compensation could be included in the contractual
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agreement. Once these three conditions exist, the auction
can be feasibly implemented.
While the following proposal can be useful as a model
for implementation, variations will undoubtedly occur in
order for the auction method to conform to a particular state's
regulations in the areas of land use, environmental control,
and facility siting. Modifications in state approaches are
encouraged, not only to prevent any implementation conflicts,
but also to provide a broad framework for experimentation
with this innovative policy. The purpose of this draft le-
gislation is to serve only as a model, which states can mo-
dify to fit different needs.
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A BILL
To authorize the State of --------- to institute auctions
for the siting of future energy facilities on both pub -
lic and private lands within its boundaries; to provide
technical assistance to those localities eligible under
the program to submit a bid; to establish the Department
of Facility Siting (D.F.S.) within the Office of the Gov -
ernor; and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Legislators in the Congress of
the State of ----------, here assembled,
Section (1)
(a) Short Title. -- This Act may be sited as the
--------- Energy Facility Siting Act of 19
Section (2) Statement of Policy and Purpose. --
(a) The Legislators, recognizing that the Nation's
supply of domestic energy is in need of further
development and that the siting of related fa-
cilities should be done most expeditiously, de-
clares that it is the policy of the State Gov -
ernment to render assistance to Local Govern-
ments to enable them to accommodate energy de-
velopment in an equitable manner.
(b) It is the purpose of this Act to --
(1) encourage expeditious and efficient plan -
ing and siting of energy facilities;
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(2) insure that the costs of socio-economic im- 25
pacts, as valued by the locality, are includ- 26
ed in the assessment of a site as a potential 27
location for the construction and operation 28
of an energy facility; and 29
(3) provide more equitable siting of energy fa- 30
cilities by compensating residents of lo- 31
calities that are affected, as well as the 32
communities themselves. 33
Section (3) Definitions. -- For the purpose of this Act: 34
(a) "Auction For Facility Siting" means the system 35
outlined in this Act which authorizes politi- 36
cal units to bid in order to have an energy fa- 37
cility develop within their jurisdictions. 38
(b) "Bid" means an offer by a political unit, such 39
that if it is accepted the political unit will 40
agree to facilitate the development of the ener- 41
gy facility; 42
(c)"Compensation" means the amount of indemnifica- 43
tion paid by a developer to a political unit 44
and its residents at the time of the bid, in ex- 45
change for the right to develop an energy faci- 46
lity. "Residents at the time of the bid," re- 47
fers to those persons legally residing within 48
the political unit at the time of the bid, in- 49
cluding minors. 50
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(d) "Developer" means any person or persons who di- 51
rectly or indirectly, through any formal or in- 52
formal combination or aggregation, propose to 53
construct an "energy facility" as defined in 54
subsection (f) hereof. 55
(e) "Director" means the Director of the Department 56
of Facility Siting established under this Act. 57
(f) "Energy Facility" means any of the following 58
new facilities: (1) electric generating plants 59
with a capacity of 150 megawatts or more, in- 60
cluding nuclear reactors; (2) petroleum refiner- 61
ies with a consumption capacity of 25,000 ba - 62
rels per day or more of crude oil; (3) syn- 63
thetic gasification plants, oil shale extrac- 64
tion operations, and processing plants, coal li- 65
quifaction and gasification plants, liquefied 66
natural gas conversion facilities, and uranium 67
enrichment facilities; (4) offshore petroleum 68
loading or marine transfer facilities within 69
State jurisdiction; (5) underground or strip 70
coal mine operations; and (6) any other facili- 71
ties or additions to facilities defined and iden- 72
tified by the Director pursuant to this Act. 73
(g) "Federal Lands" means any land owned by the 74
United States without regard to how the U. S. 75
acquired ownership of the land, and without re- 76
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gard to the agency having responsibility for 77
management thereof. 78
(h) "Governor" means the Chief Executive of the State. 79
(i) "Local Government" means the government of a 80
specific local area constituting a subdivision 81
of a state, or other major political unit. 82
(j) "Non-Federal Land" means all lands which are not 83
Federal lands as defined in subsection (g) hereof.84
(k) "Political Unit" means any general purpose unit 85
of local government as defined by the Bureau of 86
the Census; and any regional, intergovernmental,- 87
or other public entity which is deemed by the 88
Governor and the Courts to have authority to 89
represent its constituents in a contractual a- 90
greement. Two or more local governments sub- 91
mitting a joint bid shall be considered a po- 92
litical unit. 93
(1) "Secondary Impacts" mean the social and economiic 94
effects caused by energy facility construction 95
and operation. Also sometimes referred to as 96'
"socio-economic impacts." 97
(m) "State" means the State of ----------, one of .the 98
constituent units of the U.S. Federal Govern- 99
ment. 100
Section- (4) Department of Facility Siting 101
(a) There is hereby established in the Office of 102
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the Governor the Department of Facility Siting 103
(D.F.S.) 104
(b) The Department of Facility Siting shall have a 105
Director who is appointed by the Governor, by 106
and with the advice and consent of the State Le- 107
gislature, and such other officers and employees 108
as may be required. The Director shall have 109
such duties and responsibilities in addition to 110
those specified by law, as the Governor may 111
assign. 112
(c) The Governor, acting through the Department of 113
Facility Siting, shall -- 114
(1)Immediately institute pursuant to this Act 115
an auction method for energy facility siting 116
on federal and non-federal lands with the foj- 117
.lowing provisions: 118
a) Upon decision to plan for the construction 119
of an energy facility, a developer must 120
select a minimum of two potential sites 121
considered to be adequate to support the 122
project. Exemptions will be granted to 123
those industries, who in the opinion of 124
the Department of Facility Siting, can 125
feasibly develop on only one site. Ex- 126
emptions will also be made for sites al- 127
ready approved for development prior to 128
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the passage of this Act. Political units 129
not originally selected by the industry 130
as alternative, but are considered to be 131
potentially suitable sites, can petition 132
the Director for consideration. The Di- 133
rector maintains the authority to declare 134
a site eligible, even if it was not origi- 135
nally selected by the developer. Develop- 136
ers shall serve timely notice to the Of- 137
fice of Socio-Economic Assessment of all 138
plans for energy facility development, 139
and shall present a list of potential sites 140
as specified hereof. 141
(b) Upon approval of a list of sites by the 142
Director, the developer shall submit a 143
comprehensive report of the planned pro- 144
ject to the Director, and to the represen- 145
tative political units of government with- 146
in whose jurisdiction the eligible poten- 147
tial site exists. This report shall in- 148
clude a complete description of the faci- 149
lity, including a timetable for construc- 150
tion and operation thereof, as specified 151
by the Department of Facility Siting. New 152
demands on the locality's public and pri- 153
vate services (such as water and sewage 154
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treatment), shall be documented by the 155
developer. The Director may also require 156
the inclusion of such other information 157
as he or she deems necessary. The Depart- 158
ment of Facility Siting shall promulgate 159
data on the potential impacts caused by 160
the project, and submit this information 161
to localities prior to their submission 162
of a bid. A bid should be submitted by 163
the political unit, the amount of which 164
is to be determined by the information 165
provided by the developer and the State, 166
as based on the following method: 167
The political unit shall establish 168
zones on a geographic basis within the 169
eligible boundaries, to indicate varying 170
degrees of severity of impacts. Within 171
each zone a random sampling of residents 172
shall take place, to determine a median 173
amount of compensation deemed adequate 174
for that area. Extreme bids shall not be 175
counted, at the discretion o.f the politi- 176
cal unit. The median amount, times the 177
number of residents, shall be indicative 178
of the amount of compensation requested 179
by that zone. Data acquired in such a 180
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manner shall be non-binding, and serve as 181
community input into the decision on the 182
final bid. 183
(c) Within six months of receipt of the com- 184
prehensive report, the political unit, as 185
a representative of its constituents, 186
shall submit a bid to the developer, a co- 187
py of which must simultaneously be filed 188
with the Director. In cases where more 189
than one jurisdiction is affected, one bid 190
shall be decided upon by intergovernmen- 191
tal agreement. The bid should reflect the 192
level of compensation deemed adequate by 193
the political unit in exchange for allow- 194
ing the facility to be located in its area 195
within the terms of the contract. If a 196
community fails to submit a bid within the 197
specified time period, the state retains 198
the option to specify a default bid. It 199
is explicitly permissable for political 200
units and developers to negotiate indivi- 201
dually the bid amounts and modifications 202
to the proposed plan. 203
(d) No later than six months after receipt of 204
the bids, the developer shall choose the 205
precise site for the construction of the 206
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energy facility, subject to oversight by 207
the Dept. of Facility Siting. For public 208
developers, the amount of compensation re- 209
quested must be considered as a cost in 210
a cost/benefit analysis. 211
(e) The developer and the political unit would 212
then sign a contractual agreement, legally 213
binding on both parites, to have the pro- 214
ject completed within the locality and the 215
compensation paid in full to the community 216
over a mutually agreed upon specified pe- 217
riod, but not to exceed 5 years, from the 218
initial day of construction. The compen- 219
sation will be paid: % of the specified 220
amount to the political unit for distri- 221
bution to residents living within the jur- 222
isdiction at the time the bid was sub- 223
mitted. Compensation to the individuals 224
shall be paid on a per capita basis, with 225
varying amounts allowed, depending on the 226
zone of residence. The proportional am- 227
ount of compensation requested by the re- 228
sidents in the random sample should be 229
considered in the allocation decision. 230
The remaining __% would be granted to the 231
political unit for community use. The 232
developer would also stipulate that the 233
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comprehensive report is a reasonable ex- 234
pectation of the impacts of the project. 235
The political unit would maintain a re- 236
sponsibility to facilitate completion of 237
the project, and make any zoning, regula- 238
tory or land use changes necessary for 239
the completion of the project, as speci- 240
fied in the contract. 241
Section (5) Limitations on the Auction Model as specified 242
in the Act 243
(a) The authority to approve or disapprove applica- 244
tions for energy facilities, shall continue to 245
reside in those Federal agencies possessing spe- 246
cific statutory authority over proposed energy 247
facilities or their.appendages. 248
(b) This Act shall not be construed to supersede or 249
take perecedence over existing environmental re- 250
gulations at either the Federal or State statu- 251
tory level. Current State Environmental Impact 252
Statement requirements, as well as the mandates 253
under N.E.P.A. shall still be deemed valid, and 254
applicable to the final site selected through 255
the auction process. 256
(c) The contractual agreement, once signed by a poli- 257
tical unit, shall be binding on all current and 258
future residents under its jurisdiction. 259
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(d) Compensation to the individual shall be remunera- 260
ted on a per capita basis, with every eligible re- 261
sident receiving an equal amount. Eligibility is 262
determined by residency in the jurisdiction of the 263
political unit at the time of submitting the bid 264
to the developer and the State. 265
(e) The developer shall provide additional compen- 266
sation for any further impacts created by the 267
project. The amount of compensation shall be 268
negotiable with the political unit. 269
(f) The office shall have the authority to review, 270
implement, oversee and enforce all provisions 271
of this Act, as deemed appropriate by the 272
Secretary. Appeals may be made to the Director 273
of the office, and to the Office of the Gov- 274
ernor, where permissable ................... 275
and after all administrative procedures have been 276
exhausted, the Courts. 277
(g) Upon acceptance of compensatory funds, the 278
individual resident waives the right to inter- 279
fere with the construction and operation of the 280
project, so long as the developer conforms to 281
the contractual agreement- 282
(h) Public hearings shall be held prior to submit- 283
ting the bid- 284
(i) Any section thereof declared unconstitutional, 285
shall not invalidate the entire Act. 286
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B. The Legal Issues of Implementation
1. Calculation of the "Bid"
The draft legislation in the previous section sug-
gests one possible way in which the amount of compensa-
tion, under the auction system, can be determined. While
the methods may vary slightly from state to state, all
procedures which result in this determination should meet
two criteria:
a) The Method Must be Equitable and Efficient.
In order to provide adequate compensation to the
individuals and the community, the figure that is bid must
be indicative of the amount the individuals agree to accept
in exchange for allowing energy facility development
within their jurisdiction. Thus, it must be based on
adequate information (preferably from a number of sources,
as provided for in the draft-proposal, i.e. developer,
state and locality) that will alert the community and its
representatives to the consequences of the siting, in order
for the political unit to be able to make a rational deci-
sion.
b) The Method Must Involve Citizen and Political
Unit Participation.
One of the unique aspects of the auction method
is that individuals are compensated for negative effects
caused indirectly by determinations made by their elected
representatives (be it state legislatures through a faci-
lity siting law, or local authorities who zone certain
52.
sections for industrial development). Involving the
long-standing residents in the determination of a suitable
bid will result in an increased awareness of what is
going to happen to the community, thus, they can be more
prepared to handle the impacts. In addition, these
residents may be more willing to accept the "newcomers"
than they do now, since they took part in the decision to
allow the in-migrants to come. Thus, increased citizen
awareness and participation, should yield a greater toler-
ance on their part of the actual development.
The method outlined in the draft legislation meets
both of these objectives. First, it provides an adequate
data base upon which to decide the amount of the bid.
Developers are required to disclose the full impacts of
their project, and will be held responsible for these
projections. Thus, it is in their best interest to pro-
vide accurate information from the beginning.' In addition,
the state Department of Facility Siting will provide facts
to the localities regarding secondary effects. With in-
dependent sources of disclosure, the full consequences
of the projected development should be available for
evaluation, leading to an equitable bid.
Second, the proposed draft legislation provides an
optimal method of involving citizen input and local govern-
ment participation in the determination of an equitable bid.
While the political unit is the prime decision-maker, it
assumes this responsibility with guidance from the eligible
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residents. Citizen advice is thus obtained in three ways:
a)through the conventional process of competition for
votes in the next election;
b) through the use of public hearings, local inhabitants
can voice their approval or disagreement with the proposed
project. They can also relate to the political unit
representatives further information about secondary impacts,
and the amount of compensation they would deem adequate
in exchange for allowing the development to proceed; and
c) also provided in the draft is a mandatory requirement
on the political unit to obtain estimates from the long-
standing residents on the appropriate level of per capita
compensation that should be bid. This requirement can
be met by taking a sample , random poll of residents, in
order to determine their perceptions of what a fair
amount of compensation would be., Calculations determining
the median level would be used, to eliminate the extreme
amounts that may be submitted. This method has three
advantages over the use of a referendum to determine the
perceptions and values of the citizenry: 1) the sample
would be less costly, and less of a bureaucratic problem
since the poll could be taken in a one day neighborhood
canvas, or through the mail; 2) it provides a greater
cross-representation of citizens, who may be affected in
different degrees of severity by the project. Thus,
residents from all sectors of the jurisdiction would have
relatively equal input. Second, soliciting estimates
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directly from the individuals prevents a minority opposi-
tion movement from skewing the results. For example, typi-
cally the percentage of voters who participate in referenda
is very small. Those who are most vocal in either support
or opposition are more likely to vote, thus not truly
providing a figure indicative of the preferences of the
community at large. This is particularly true in small,
rural areas.
A disadvantage of this latter method is that not
everyone who wants to provide input is guaranteed a vote
in the sampling. However, everyone has an equal likeli-
hood of being consulted. Also, public hearings are pro-
vided for, and residents can always voluntarily submit
an estimate to the political unit.
While community input is solicited, the strategic
process of bidding is best done by the elected officials.
Presumably, the town leaders are representatives of the
people, entrusted to make decisions on a broad array of
subjects ranging from the amounts of taxation to compre-
hensive land use laws. Under our constitutional as-
sumptions, all power derives from the people, who in turn
delegate it to representative instruments which they
create. The local government is in a better position of
expertise to weigh all of the relevant information,
and make a bid which is in the best interest of its con-
stituents. The delegation of such power to the political
unit is certainly permissable under current laws.04'4
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2. Allocation of the Compensation
In Chapter I, the justification for compensating
the long-term resident, rather than the community exclu-
sively, was presented. In this section, a specific model
of compensation is outlined, giving the lagal basis for
such action. Under the current law of eminent domain,
the amount of indemnification is given to the land owner
directly in the form of one cash payment. However, other
variations of compensation are also legally acceptable,
and should be compared.
Under the draft legislation, 100% of the compensation
is paid directly to the political unit that originally
submitted the bid. This may be done in one immediate
payment or in a series of payments not to extend beyond a
five year period. The terms of the contract can be
mutually agreed upon by the parties involved, with regard
to the time of payment. The purpose in providing such a
clause, is to preclude an industry from taking an unreason-
ably long time to make the payments. For example, if an
individual does not receive indemnification until 20 years
after the construction period, then the purpose of "fair
compensation" loses all effect. In order for the system
to be efficient, the individual should be compensated for
the difficulties experienced, when they occur.
Another area of concern over the allocation of
compensatory payments through the political unit, is the
doctrine that limits the expenditure of funds by a local
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government, to projects having a public purpose. However,
this should provide no serious impediment to the locali-
ties for a number of reasons:
1. The money allocated does not come from general
revenue sources, but rather from a private concern
for a special interest.
2. Court decisions governing expenditures have dealt
mostly with the legality of a municipality en-
4 4gaging in expenditures for profit. This is not
at all analogous to the Auction Method, where
the distinction remains that payments are made to
individuals as compensation.
3. Even if the public purpose doctrine was strictly
applied to the auction method, as mentioned in
Chapter I,.the legal definition of public purpose
has recently been expanded under the Belle-Terre
decision, based on the earlier decision of
Berman v. Parker.The general welfare of the
community is usually enough reason to justify
an action taken by the political unit.
Upon receipt of the remuneration, the political unit
retains a pre-determined (by State Law) percentage of the
payment, the sum of which is free to be used as the com-
munity sees fit. The remaining amount is to be allocated
on a per capita basis to the individuals who are affected,
i.e. to bona fide residents within the jurisdiction at the
time of the bid.
57.
iLLUSTRATION I
Zoning Geographically for Compensation
KEY
A - Most Severely Impacted
B - Less Severely Impacted
C - Least Severely Affected Area
Note: The zones do not have to be concentric, but
rather, designation should be left up to the
local government.
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However, the amount of compensation granted to
the individual can legally vary, depending on the ex-
tent to which the person is affected by the growth im-
pacts. The draft legislation provides for such flexibi-
lity, by defining areas (based on geographic location)
to reflect varying degrees of impacts (see Illustra-
tion III). Thus, communities divide the jurisdiction
into these zones, with compensation varying only between
(but not within) designated areas.
For example, in Illustration III, residents of Area
A would probably be the most severely affected by environ-
mental degradation, dense population growth, traffic con-
gestion, etc. Area B would experience the same negative
impacts as A, but to a lesser extent. Area C in this
model, is inhabited by individuals affected only to the
extent that the municipal services are overtaxed, forcing
them to suffer the plight of inadequate schools, etc.
Residents of C would also be faced with the burden of
additional taxes to pay for the needed improvements. How-
ever, their immediate area is not facing congestion: an
equitable system would compensate them to a lesser extent
than those in A and B. This designation of areas is per-
missable as long as it furthers a "legitimate state in-
terest.",4 In the example of the auction method, the state
interest is the fair compensation of individuals for
secondary impacts; which is furthered by designating
certain areas as more severely affected, in order to make
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the payment commensurate with the degree of hardship.
"Just compensation" under eminent domain regulations
works on an individual basis, analogous to the situation
at hand. If all individuals were compensated in varying
degrees according to differing circumstances, the locality
would be faced with a bureaucratic overload that could
take years to get through if done properly. Thus, under
the draft proposal, the political unit would designate
zones and pay the required percentage of the compensation
to individuals on a per capita basis. The amount received
would be determined by their place of residence, with con-
sideration given to the amount requested by the residents
of the zone in the random sample.
An alternative to individual cash payments is to
have the local political unit pay the amount by a tax
credit. However, this would not work since the only
credit that legally could be given would be on the property
tax. If this system were adopted, than the non property
owning residents would not receive their compensation.
Landlords could not be forced to pass the gains on through
rent decreases. The potential for serious inequity would
prevail.
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3. Contractual Obligations of the Municipality
Under the terms of the draft legislative proposal,
in exchange for the payment of compensation, the locality
agrees in the contract to facilitate the completion of
the project, by making any necessary zoning, regulatory and
land use changes within its power. "Within its power" is
a very important phrase, since the legal authority over
land use regulations will vary from one locality to the
next. For example, if a locality has no land use regu-
lations, but the State has a comprehensive land use act,
could the former government grant permission for develop-
ment, and guarantee no restrictions? The answer to this
question can only be found by reviewing the specific
statutory wording of the State land use act. If it
"enables" the community to develop its own land use
regulations, then of course, a guarantee could be made.
However, if the state law supersedes local authority in
this area, then regulatory rights could not be relinquished
to the developer by a local government.
Thus, in signing a "good-faith" contract, the communi-
ty would have to be willing to make the necessary changes
only under its jurisdiction. An example of this is the
power to zone, which traditionally is a local power
granted by State enabling legislation, and upheld by the
courts. Since 1926 in the Euclid v. Ambler 47 case, zon-
ing has been declared a valid exercise of authority with
justification found in the police power to protect the
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public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Under
the auction concept, a locality would have to agree to zone
the developers' land for the type of project proposed.
The types of regulatory powers retained by localities
will vary, with some areas having ordinances concerning
noise pollution, limitations on the size of vehicles
having access on public streets, height restrictions on
smokestacks, or any other of a variety of possible regula-
tions passed to meet local needs. In signing an agree-
ment, it will be up to the developer to be aware of all
such local restrictions, and request that any changes ne-
cessary be put specifically in writing in the contract.
In terms of the Court's "good-faith" mandate, the locality
should inform the developer of any existing restrictions
4 8that might impair the project. Depending on the specific
wording of the local government's charter, or any sub-
sequent authorizing legislation, this part of'the draft
legislation will have to be modified.
Under most circumstances, a local government has
the authority, as elected representatives, to enter a
contractual agreement on behalf of its citizens with pri-
vate parties. Precedent for this is found in a govern-
ment's hiring of town employees, contracting with a
utility industry for services, contracting with a private
sanitation company to take care of disposal problems, or
hiring a private concern to maintain the city streets.
In these examples, individuals of the town do not have
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the right to break the agreements, or fire those directly
employed - the power rests in the government itself as
the only representative of the people as a whole.
Similarly, under a contractual agreement of the auction
method, an individual will not have standing to breach
the contract or sue, unless he can document a specific
constitutional deprivation of rights which resulted
directly from the action of the government. 4 9Once compen-
sation has been received, the individual waives the right
to sue, as long as the developer does not breach the
agreement.
While individuals could not breach the contract,
under certain conditions, the contract entered into by
the local government could be subject to community wide
review, such as by referendum. 50 This is one potential
problem confronting the auction model. Im some juris-
dictions, new ordinances or changes in existing ones
can be made only after a vote has been takten among the
constituents. In localities with such regulatory
procedures, the "bid" itself could not be binding. The
legality of such provisions has recently been upheld in the
Supreme Court case of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises
Inc. 5 1 Mr. Chief Justice Burger in the majority opinion
upheld the Eastlake, Ohio City Charter which required
proposed land use changes to be ratified by 55% of the
voters. The decision of the Court was based on the 1969
decision of Hunter v. Erickson where it was found that in:
establishing legislative bodies, the people
reserve to themselves the power to deal
directly with matters which might otherwise
be assigned to the legislature.s2
A local government thus cannot deprive the constituents
of this right, even though a contractual agreement exists.
Under such circumstances, there is a remedy: A political
unit would submit a bid, which if it were selected by
the developer as the most favorable, would be voted upon
by the citizens prior to the actual signing of the agree-
ment. The ballot would specify the changes needed, and
approval would constitute a de facto sanction of the
contractual agreement. Thus, the bidding process could
appropriately remain secret, yet the agreement become le-
gally binding, if done so in such a manner.
This same problem of voter approval can also
occur with a slight variation. A number of state consti-
tutions and statutes, as well as-municipal charters re-
quire submission of a question to the voters once a cer-
tain number of signatures has been gathered on a petition
so requesting.ssFor example, in Akron, Ohio, the city
charter may be amended, or measures enacted by the Council
repealed through a referendum which may be obtained on a
petition of 10% of the voters.54 The State of Maryland also
has a constitutional provision allowing a town's electorate
to pass on any legislation upon petition of a specified
fraction of the electorate. 5 5 Under such circumstances, a
contractual agreement is subject to potential nullifica-
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tion by a referendum vote. In some instances, there is
no time limitation as to when this petition for a refer-
endum may be filed.
If such a potential threat of referendum does exist,
two remedies are available to prevent the type of occur-
rence described above. First, the State can pass a
resolution, as part of the Facility Siting Bill, which
stipulates a 30 day time limit on bringing petitions for
a referendum that would review the contractual agreement.
A second option would be to demand a special, binding
referendum prior to the signing of the' agreement, to
prevent any potential difficulties. Once an ordinance has
been ratified by a referendum vote, it is binding, and
obviates the possibility of further oetitions. Also,
it is Dresumed that if people are adequately compensated,
their incentive or motive for- such action will be dimi-
nished. A locality must make some provision for dealing
with this problem, or else it could be held liable for
subsequent breach of the contract.
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4. Breach of the Contract
As described in the previous section, political units
must not go beyond the scope of their authority in signing
an agreement. To do so subjects them to the liability for
any subsequent breach. Basically, both parties in signing
the contract, assume the responsibility of performing in
good faith. Under UCC § 1 - 203, "Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement."56 "Good-Faith" is
legally defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." 57Good-Faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety
of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith"
because it violates community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness.)
With regards to the auction method, as proposed in
the draft legislation, a developer is liable for any
impacts that run beyond the scope of his comprehensive
reports. If the developer can prove that the impacts
were unforeseeable, then no damages (other than further
compensation) can be collected. If it is assumed that
the effects could reasonably have been projected, then
the developer is guilty of breach of contract in good
faith, because he wasn't giving an entire honest picture
of what the people were being compensated for. In this
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case, damages as negotiated by the developer and the
political unit (or as a last resort in the courts),
would have to be paid. If additional compensatory and/or
damage money is granted, it should be done so in the form
of payment to the political unit, decided upon by
negotiation with the community.
Various circumstances will necessitate specific
changes to make this site auction suitable for State use,
in order to comply with the non-federal regulations.
Chapter III provides an example of how to adapt the model
to meet specific circumstances, by discussing its implemen-
tation with regard to the laws in Colorado.
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III. AUCTIONS FOR ENERGY FACILITY SITING IN COLORADO
As previously noted, implementation plans will vary
from state to state, depending on the existing legislation.
The purpose of this Chapter is to apply the concept to
the State of Colorado, adapting the draft legislative
proposal to comply with the specific needs of this
jurisdiction, as well as the statutory requirements.
A. Current State Procedures for Energy Facility Siting
The State of Colorado, with a 1970 population
of 2,364,000 depends largely on agriculture to maintain
its economy. However, energy development and mineral
extraction are becoming increasingly important.5 The
coal industry in recent years has increased production
to 9 million tons per year, mostly in the Western part
of the State.6 This expansion coupled with the construc-
tion of electrical generating power plants has resulted
in a rapid population growth for the counties of Mesa,
Rio Blanco and Garfield (See Illustration IV). This prime
energy development area had a 1970 population of 74,000
which has since increased to an estimated 90,600 in 1977.61
Currently in Colorado, facility siting decisions are
made almost exclusively by the developer, presumably in
response to a number of primary factors, such as trans-
portation and the availability of natural resources. Un-
like its neighboring State of Wyoming, Colorado does not
have a comprehensive Energy Facility Siting Law to regulate
such action. It has a statewide land use act, but this
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serves primarily to protect the natural resources,
mandating an environmental impact statement to be drawn
up prior to facility construction, and also grants
zoning powers to the municipalities. Other power to
regulate development is granted to localities, but only
when it relates to activities of a "state interest."
According to Colorado statutes, "state interest" refers
to natural hazard areas where development could have
a significant impact on historical, natural or archeological
resources of statewide importance.6 2
The status quo decision-making process does not
assess socio-economic impacts prior to choosing an energy
facility site. No existing State legislation in Colorado
mandates such assessment, nor does it place any responsi-
bility for socio-economic effects on the developer.
Industry, once it meets the environmental requirements, is
under no obligation to compensate the community and/or
the residents individually for the rapid growth problems.
The only important example of industrial support is
the Mid-Continent Coal Company which gave a $10,000 planning
grant to the severely impacted town of Carbondale, in
addition to providing transportation to and from the mines
for the workers.6 3 The State also provides monetary
grants to localities which come from Federal Mineral Lease
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Payments. However, no compensation is provided to the
individuals. The State of Colorado strategy is to
70.
leave the site selection process to the developer with
minimal constraints, and then assist communities in
coping with problems of growth management.
r-
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B. The Prospects for Future Energy Growth
The energy industry in Colorado is likely to grow
dramatically within the next decade, particularly with
President Carter's commitment to developing domestic
supplies, rather than relying on expensive imports.
Within this state's boundaries lie vast deposits of
coal, which are expected to be developed at a rate of 15
million tons per year by 1980, un from the current 9
tons per year production level. " The development of oil
shale is also likely to increase; Over 70% of all known
domestic deposits are located in Colorado, where an
estimated 118 billion barrels of oil are concentrated in
the Piceance Basin area (see Illustration II )6. In
addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has designated
the State as a potential location for nuclear power plants
(refer to Chapter I)
The auction method is particularly feasible for the
siting of nuclear power plants, where more site choices
are available. Also, coal gasification plants, oil shale
processing plants, refineries, and various electrical
generating power plants can also be more readily
sited in the future by this method. The following
hypothetical example shows how the auction ides works in
conjunction with existing State laws. Illustration III
depicts the possible areas for future energy facility
siting.
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C. The Auction Model in Colorado
The following amendments would coordinate the State
statutes in Colorado with the draft legislative proposal,
so as not to conflict with any unnecessarily strong
constraints. The lines of the draft legislation were
numbered for cross-referencing the amendments.
Amendments to Draft Legislation
1. Introduction (line 5) should read: to expand the
power of the Socio- Economic Impact Office, within the
Office of the Governor;
Colorado already has such a Department to assess the
impacts from energy facility siting. With the new legis-
lation, it would be expanded from a research group that
allocates community grants, to-a decision-making Depart-
ment that would oversee the auctions.
2. Section 3 (e) (line 56) should read: "Director"
means the Director of the Socio-Economic Impact Assess-
ment Office.
3. Omit Section 3 (f) (4) (line 68). Colorado would
not have to contend with offshore or marine transfer
facilities. Instead, Section 3 (f) (4) should read:
uranium mining and mineral extraction activities.
4. Section 3 (i) (line 80) should read: "Local Govern-
ment" means a county, home rule or statutory city, town,
territorial charter city, or city and county." § 29-20-
103 of the Statutes.
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5. Section 3 (k), defining the "political unit", shall
include the following clause at line 93: According to
§29-1-202 of the Statutes, this shall include to mean a
county, city and county, city, town, service authority,
school district, local authority, water, sanitation, fire
protection, metropolitan, irrigation, drainage, or other
special district, or any other kind of municipal, quasi-
municipal, or public corporation organized pursuant to
law.
6. Section 4 Title (line 101) and subsequent references
to the Office of Facility Siting should read: The Office
of Socio-Economic Impact Assessment.
7. Section 4 (a) (line 102) should read: The delegated
responsibilities of the Office of Socio-Economic Impact
Assessment shall hereby be expanded in accordance with
this Act.
8. Section 4 (c) (1) (e) shall include the following
clause at line 241: The contractual agreement, once
signed, does not take effect for 30 days. During this
period, the contract is subject to revision by the local
government if a petition is filed in protest against the
agreement or any part thereof. The petition must be
signed by qualified electors in number of at least 15% of
the last preceding vote, for governor, within the munici-
pality. If no changes are made by the legislature to meet
the requests of the petition, the contract shall be sub-
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mitted to a vote of the qualified electors at a special
election to be called for that purpose. The agreement
would take effect and become binding if a majority of
those voting approve the contract.
As we saw in Chapter II, the threat of overrule by
petition and/or referendum could cause serious delay.
However, Colorado Statute §1-40-116 places a reasonable
time limit on such action. In order for a community to
avoid a breach of contract, should a referendum alter
the agreement, a clause indicating such must be added
to the actual contract. Thus, when the industry
signs, it knows that the agreement is not legally bind-
ing until after the 30 day period. This fulfills the
contractual obligations of "giving notice" and main-
taining "reasonableness" for the agreement. Once the
time period passes, no further protesting netition can
be filed, according to Brownlow v. Wunsch.6 7
9. Section 4 (c) (1) (e), lines 236 to 241 should read:
The political unit would maintain a responsibility to
help facilitate the completion of the project, and make
any necessary zoning changes, empowered by §31-23-301 of
the Statutes. In addition, any reasonable changes in
regulations, as authorized in §29-20-104, shall also be
required.
In Colorado, 531-23-301 is the State enabling legis-
lation which gives localities the right to zone land for
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specific uses and restrict the size of construction
projects. § 29-10-104 is the statute that defines the
powers of the local government, which includes provisions
such as: the regulation of development and activities
in hazardous areas; regulating the establishment of
roads on public lands; regulating phased development
of services and facilities; and finally, planning for
and regulating the use of land for orderly protection
of the environment. This statute also gives the local
units power to "cooperate or contract with other units
of government pursuant to the statutes, for the purpose
of planning or regulating the development of land."
Thus, if impacts are expected to transcend local govern-
ment boundaries, the political units already have the
authority to cooperate in the joint venture of submitting
a bid and accruing the compensation. Under Colorado
statutes, special districts can also be created for this
purpose, if the policymakers consider this to be a more
viable option.
In addition, if the local government can fulfill
its obligations primarily through zoning changes, there
is a smaller chance of local minority opposition delay-
ing the auction method, by challenges in the Court. First,
the Colorado Courts have upheld the notion that zoning
is a matter of local and municipal concern. In 1974,
two cases, City of Greely v. Ells 68 and Rademan v. City
and County of Denver, both concluded that zoning is
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best left to the local government, and decisions related
to the course of community development should be upheld.
Second, in determining the validity of a zoning
ordinance, presumption rests with the decision of the
local government. City and County of Denver v. Ruwart
Chevrolet (1973), Leasing Development Company v. Board
of County Commissioners, 7 1 and once again, the Greeley v.
7 2
Ells case all support the theory that one who chal-
lenges a zoning ordinance must overcome the presumption
in favor of the validity of such a law. It must be
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the ordinance
should be declared invalid. In challenging the validity
of a zoning ordinance, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved
party to establish that, as applied to this property,
the ordinance is confiscatory, and deprives him of the
use of his land without due process of law. 7 3 Thus, the
plaintiff would have a difficult time proving the zoning
charges unreasonable, particularly since he is receiving
compensation for the socio-economic impacts.
Since Colorado currently has no Energy Facility
Siting legislation, very little deviation is required
from the draft model. Basically, it would follow the
standard proposal of submitting bids and receiving compen-
sation in return. The major difference is found in the
statutes on petitioning for a review of a governmental
decision. However, as long as these restrictions are in-
cluded in the contract, no community should be held liable
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for a subsequent alt'eration or cancellation due to the
referendum requirements. Otherwise, all of the necessary
support statutes exist: the local power to zone; the
local ability to enter into a contractual agreement;
and the ability to have intergovernmental cooperation in
legally binding agreements. In addition, the Office of
Socio-Economic Assessment could readily handle the over-
sight of the auction process. It already handles funds
from the mineral lease payments, and is currently estab-
lishing a computerized data base to monitor secondary
impacts. 7 4Thus, the auction method should encounter no
legal barriers for the future selection of sites for
energy facilities.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The siting of energy facilities will become in-
creasingly important in the future, particularly during
the transition of this country from reliance on imported
to domestic sources of energy. While most of our na-
tion's siting policies have focused attention on en-
vironmental concerns, socio-economic impacts which cause
hardships for individuals, also pose a problem.
A solution can be found by conducting an auction of
the potential sites, with political units bidding for
energy development to be located within their juris-
diction, in exchange for monetary compensation. The
advantages of such a method include a more optimal selec-
tion of a site, since all costs will be evaluated in
choosing a location, rather than just those affecting
the environment. Also, individuals whose quality of
life decreases, receive indemnification for bearing the
brunt of problems associated with rapid population growth.
The auction concept is unlike any other proposal ever
tried for energy facility siting, and, as such, its actual
legitimacy has not been directly tested by the Courts.
However, in the embryonic stage of its development,
issues of legal concern arise when devising such a model.
While this thesis raises some of these concerns, it is
by no means a comprehensive analysis of all the potential
issues involved. Rather, the purpose has been to discuss
the basic implementation questions, in an attempt to de-
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velop a reasonable model of draft legislation which would
presumably be upheld in the courts.
As previously noted, the legislative proposal serves
only as an example for other States to follow. State
policymakers, in adapting the draft to their unique
circumstances, will be confronted with a myriad of
choices and subsequent legal concerns associated with
implementation and its relationship to State statutes.
Some of these issues worthy of further study include:
1. The problem of interjurisdictional
conflicts: special districts versus volun-
tary intergovernmental cooperation.
2. Should property owning non-residents
be eligible for compensation?
3. Should the contractual agreement al-
ways be submitted to the citizens for a
binding vote?
4. Can a citizen legitimately allege that
he has not received "just compensation"
in light of his per/capita compensation,
because he is experiencing more severe
hardships?
5. To what extent does the auction method
conflict with existing State Energy Facility
Siting Legislation and/or environmental
regulations?
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Thus, in conclusion, preliminary findings indicate
that the auction model is suitable for energy facility
siting. While certain variations may detract from its
legitimacy, only an actual trial period in a few states
can indicate with any degree of certainty, that this
is a workable concept in practice and theory. It can
be tried with the siting of almost any locally noxious
facility, so long as existing state regulations are not
in conflict, and more than one site is available for
the process.
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45Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. U.S. 39 L.
Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974). Berman v. Parker
348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98 99 L. Ed. 27.
46Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272
U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303
4 7Ibid.
48UCC 1-203. Also see Fuller and Eisenberg, Basic
Contract Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.)
1972. pp. 625-26.
49Supra, -43.
50Gunther, Gerald. Constitutional Law: Cases and
Materials (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press) 1975.
5 1Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 96
S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
52Hunter v. Erickson, 303 U.S. 385, 89 S. Ct.
557, 21 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1969).
53Supra, 50.
54Supra, 52.
55Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F. 2d. 862 (4th Cir. 1968).
5 6 Supra 48.
86.
UCC 1-201-(19).
UCC 1-203. Restatement Second. S. 231.
5 9 Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Incorporated,
The Rocky Mountain Region: A Unity of Interests
(Denver: Federation of Rocky Mountain States, 1975) p. 17.
6 0 Denver Post, 9 January 1977. p. 4.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970. Also, telephone
interview with Burman Lorenson, Director, Socio-
Economic Impact Assessment Office, Denver, December,
1976.
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1976 Cumulative Supplement,
Section 24-65. 1-203. "Areas and activities of State
Interest." pp. 89-91.
6 3 Supra, 37.
6 4 Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Section IX,
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (1975). Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976. Over the past three
years the State has accumulated $73 million under these
programs, excluding any interest on the funds.
6 5 Supra, 60.
6 6 Interagency Task Force on Oil Shale, Federal Energy
Administration Project Independence Blueprint final Task
Force ReDort, Washington, D.C., November, 1974.
67Brownlow v. Wunsch, 103 Colorado 120, 83 P 2d 775.
Also, Supra, 62, Section 1-40-109.
68City of Greeley v. Ells, 186 Colorado 352, 527 P 2d. 538
(1974).
69 Rademan v. City and County of Denver, 186 Colorado
250, 526 P 2d. 1325 (1974).
70 City and County of Denver v. Ruwart Chevrolet,
32 Colorado App. 191, 508 P 2d. 789 (1973).
87.
71Leasing Development Company v. Board of County Com-
missioners, 186 Colorado 418, 528 P2d. 237 (1974).
72Supra 70.
73Interview with Burman Lorenson, Coordinator for the
Colorado Socio-Economic Assessment Office, July, 1976.
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